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When New Zealand changed its electoral system from 
first-past-the-post (FPP) to mixed member proportional 
representation (MMP), the move was heralded as the end 
of old politics. Prime ministers and their Cabinet would 
no longer be the ‘elected dictatorship’. The executive would 
now be constrained by greater checks and balances. The 
two-party system that had held New Zealand politics 
hostage for at least 60 years would end and instead a greater 
diversity of interests would be represented in the House of 
Representatives, a House that could better hold the executive 
to account. This was the aim, but has it happened? This 
article examines recent instances of executive actions that are 
akin to those taken in the FFP era that MMP has been unable 
to eliminate. It also offers suggestions for how to increase 
the accountability of the executive by strengthening the 
constitution and other branches and offices of state.
Harshan Kumarasingham is currently the Henry Charles Chapman Fellow 
in Commonwealth Studies at the University of London. He previously 
worked for the New Zealand Treasury, and is the author of Onward with 
Executive Power: Lessons from New Zealand 1947-57 (Wellington: 
Institute of Policy Studies, 2010), which this article is based upon.
After being prime minister for three 
terms, the Labour leader conceded defeat 
after a convincing loss at the general 
election. The long and eventful Labour 
administration was to be replaced by a 
National one headed by an energetic and 
ebullient leader untested in experience as 
prime minister, but primed and prepared 
for power. John Key, the 11th National 
Party leader, in 2008 replaced Helen 
Clark, the 11th Labour Party leader, as 
prime minister after nine years just as Sid 
Holland succeeded Peter Fraser almost 60 
years earlier. 
Key, like Holland (except for a few 
months in the War Cabinet in 1942), 
became prime minister without having 
critical experience of government, and 
yet both Key and Holland had long held 
the ambition to become leader of New 
Zealand. They had also both campaigned 
on the promise that National had 
something new to offer the electorate after 
the long years of Labour rule. However, 
Holland and Key astutely did not seek 
to tamper with many of the successful 
policies of the previous administration. 
Instead they projected their vitality and 
freshness, because, although government 
had become almost synonymous with 
‘Old Peter’ and ‘Aunty Helen’, the 
Executive Power 
60 Years On Has 
Anything Changed?
Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 4 – November 2010 – Page 47
New Zealand people had decided it was 
only fair to ‘give the other fellow a go’. 
Clark, like Fraser, had generous 
experience of the Treasury benches and 
had won three election victories. These 
Labour titans, however, after nine years in 
the top job were both unable to persuade 
the voters to give them another term in 
office, allowing the National Party to gain 
office with a mandate for reform, but not 
revolution.
The MMP era
So, 60 years on is executive government 
in New Zealand the same? No. The MMP 
representation system has revolutionised 
the electoral system and changed the 
political landscape without question. The 
hegemony over the political system that 
Labour and National governments exerted 
under Fraser and Holland is effectively 
over. The two-party dominance is gone 
and instead the House of Representatives 
and the Cabinet table must be shared by 
other parties and partners in a way that 
a parliamentary historian would have to 
look way back to the Massey–Ward era 
to find some form of precedent for. The 
proportional system has compelled the 
‘Wellington model’ of the Westminster 
system to adopt governing arrangements 
and parliamentary accommodations 
that would have been unthinkable and 
unnecessary 60 years ago.
However, many of the constitutional 
issues that faced the era of Fraser and 
Holland can also be seen in the era 
of Clark and Key. The change to New 
Zealand’s electoral system did not cause 
the evaporation of concerns over the 
excesses of the executive. Indeed, it 
would be delusional to heap on MMP 
the responsibility for curing all our 
constitutional ills. The executive may no 
longer be unbridled, but nor has it become 
completely bridled. The Westminster 
system’s innate flexibility allows many 
of its core principles to continue despite 
key changes that MMP has demanded. As 
legal scholar Philip Joseph argues:
‘The more things change, the less 
they change.’ And so it is with MMP. 
MMP has wrought major changes to 
the New Zealand political landscape. 
It has changed the way we do the 
business of government but has left 
untouched the essential ground-rules 
of Westminster government … In its 
essential respects, the Cabinet system 
New Zealand inherited in the 1850’s 
has remained remarkably resilient 
… From a constitutional perspective, 
there has been an almost seamless 
transition from the former plurality 
voting system to MMP. The cabinet 
remains much as it was before … 
Retaining the confidence of the House 
remains the axis around which the 
entire system revolves. This imperative 
facilitates the democratic ideal and 
is the bedrock of the Westminster 
system. It has been so ever since the 
cabinet system was introduced in 
1856. (Joseph, 2008)
MMP has given more choice and more 
representativeness to the New Zealand 
voter, but this is not the same as giving 
more formal or informal checks and 
balances on the political executive. 
New Zealand in 2010 is still unitary, 
unicameral, and governed by an unwritten 
constitution. The executive, and prime 
minister in particular, still retains many 
of the prerogatives that were available 
to Fraser and Holland. In the Clark–Key 
era there have been subtle and not so 
subtle executive emanations that have 
demonstrated that prime ministerial 
power is still alive and well.
Enduring executive prerogatives
Helen Clark’s political style has been 
described as ‘presidential’ since ‘[h]er 
focus is squarely in her ability to go over 
Parliament, front for the Executive and 
work her way through and around the 
constitutional checks and balances, and 
persuade New Zealanders of the rightness 
and rectitude of her policies and unite 
them behind her’ (O’Sullivan, 2005). The 
commentator cited admits, however, that 
‘the move towards a more presidential 
style of direct action did not suddenly 
emerge under Clark’s regime. Over the 
past 20 years New Zealand prime ministers 
have increased the Executive’s reach’. An 
analysis of Clark’s leadership by a respected 
political journalist assessed that Clark 
‘imposed iron discipline on colleagues, her 
caucus and the party … As Prime Minister, 
she puts the emphasis on “prime”, being 
well briefed on what is happening across 
all portfolios, jumping on colleagues who 
muck up and even taking over if things are 
not fixed’ (Armstrong, 2008). The same 
could have been written of Fraser. Clark 
had a loyal deputy prime minister and 
finance minister in Michael Cullen (just 
as Fraser had Nash concurrently in the 
same positions) to buttress this state and 
provide much of the policy grunt required 
to action prime ministerial edicts often 
without the involvement of Cabinet.
Executive vs. judiciary
This method of government increased 
tension between the executive and 
judiciary as well. The Clark government’s 
decision to abolish appeals to the Privy 
Council and create a Supreme Court in 
New Zealand as the final appellate court in 
2003 was arguably, after MMP, the biggest 
constitutional change since the abolition 
of the Legislative Council. Unlike MMP, 
the abolition of the right to appeal to the 
Privy Council was not put to a referendum 
(Harris, 2006, pp.117-9). Thus, as with the 
removal of the upper house, the Privy 
Council appeal was eliminated from the 
the clark government’s 
decision to abolish 
appeals to the Privy 
council and create 
a supreme court in 
new Zealand as the 
final appellate court 
in 2003 was arguably, 
after mmP, the biggest 
constitutional change 
since the abolition of the 
Legislative council.
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New Zealand political landscape without 
direct public involvement. Questions over 
judicial independence arose during the 
Clark era when the government, clearly 
annoyed with the judiciary, overturned 
the Court of Appeal’s 2003 decision in 
Attorney-General v Ngati Apa1 with the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. Around 
the same time the chief justice, Dame Sian 
Elias, was also worried that the judiciary’s 
independence was being eroded by many 
of its administrative functions being taken 
over by the Ministry of Justice (similar 
concerns have been made about the Office 
of Governor-General being administered 
by the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet) and it therefore being 
‘beholden to a minister’, further ensuring 
the judiciary to the executive. Clark 
replied to Dame Sian’s position by stating 
she should ‘stick to the bench’. Further to 
this Clark appointed Cullen, ‘who had 
led the parliamentary charge against the 
Chief Justice’, as attorney-general, thereby 
charging a non-lawyer, finance minister 
and deputy leader of the Labour Party 
(among his other important political 
roles) to become the ‘principal legal 
advisor to the Government’ and ‘disregard 
partisan advantage in exercising his duties’ 
in recommending judicial appointments 
(see Stockley, 2006; NZ Herald, 2005).
National’s justice minister, Simon 
Power, has carried on the executive 
tradition of expecting the other branch 
of state to keep away from its exercise 
of power. Dame Sian delivered a speech 
which, among other issues, raised 
concerns about overcrowding in prisons 
and the question of whether alternatives 
to prison sentences might have to be 
discussed. Power immediately responded, 
with the prime minister’s backing, stating 
brusquely, ‘This is not Government 
policy. The Government was elected to set 
sentencing policy, judges are appointed to 
apply it’. Even though Dame Sian’s speech 
acknowledged that the elected politicians 
must decide on this the head of the 
judiciary was again told to ‘stick to the 
bench’, even though constitutionally it is 
within her role to discuss such matters, 
especially with her ‘extensive first hand 
experience of criminal justice matters’ 
(Geddis, 2009).
Strained conventions
The new National-led government in its 
short time in office has already tested many 
... new Zealand’s 
unicameral Parliament 
is dangerously the 
‘plaything of the 
executive’, lacking 
even with its select 
committees ‘the multiple 
layers of consideration 
that bicameralism 
provides’.
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constitutional conventions in asserting 
the New Zealand practice of impressing 
executive power over the other branches 
and offices of state. The legislature in 
the Westminster system has always been 
open to dominance by the executive. 
MMP has lessened this trend, but it has 
not succeeded in completely evading this 
political reality. In fact, the Key Cabinet is 
almost like the FPP cabinets of old, since 
there is only one party at the Cabinet table 
– the support party ministers sit outside 
Cabinet – and has been acting like an FPP 
one. National’s November 2008 result 
‘mirror[ed] the certainty that had resulted 
from elections under the FPP system’ 
since ‘[f]or the first time under MMP it 
seemed a coalition agreement would not 
be necessary’ (Hayward, 2010, p.227). The 
Clark ministry had already tested concepts 
of ministerial and collective responsibility 
when Clark creatively allowed for an ‘agree 
to disagree’ concept to reign. However, 
this left, for example, a constitutionally 
awkward situation and, especially for 
our international partners, the confusing 
spectacle of having a foreign minister 
(Winston Peters, the New Zealand First 
leader) vocally and publicly against critical 
aspects of foreign policy trade initiatives. 
Despite this, the foreign minister 
retained his authority over the ministry 
that implements foreign policy and the 
confidence of the Cabinet by representing 
the government overseas. In terms of the 
coalition politics expected of MMP this 
was pragmatic politics on the part of 
Prime Minister Clark in accommodating 
Peters, but for the health of conventions 
and executive accountability it was a 
further strain on responsible Westminster 
constitutional practice.
Executive vs. legislature
After just a week in office the new 
government surprised many by using 
urgency to rush through five major 
legislative enactments. The previous 
administration had also used urgency. 
What this showed to one astute observer 
was that ‘National appears to be behaving 
no better. Its first week in control of 
the new Parliament indicates that it 
also intends treating this institution’s 
lawmaking power as nothing more than a 
convenient means of getting the outcomes 
it wants’. Parliament would be relegated 
to the inglorious role of being ‘a rubber 
stamp that transforms the wishes of the 
government parties into law as quickly 
as possible’ (Geddis, 2008). The more 
deliberative democracy role of the House 
of Representatives hoped for under MMP 
has not eventuated enough to stymie 
executive inclinations, as urgency has 
become a more frequent practice which 
raises too few constitutional eyebrows.
Distinguished political and legal 
philosopher Professor Jeremy Waldron 
recently argued that New Zealand’s 
unicameral Parliament is dangerously the 
‘plaything of the executive’, lacking even 
with its select committees ‘the multiple 
layers of consideration that bicameralism 
provides’. Looking at our slender 
institutional structures, Waldron confesses 
that he is ‘worried that New Zealand not 
only abandoned its second chamber, but 
abandoned also other safeguards in its 
legislative process’, leaving the country 
‘with virtually none of the safeguards 
that most working democracies take for 
granted’ (Waldron, 2008). The purity of 
the executive largely remains.
Select committees were a New Zealand 
innovation meant to provide a pragmatic 
parliamentary check on the executive. 
The appointment of the associate local 
government minister, John Carter, 
in May 2009 to chair a special select 
committee dealing with Auckland local 
government issues has been described as 
‘unconscionable’ and an act that shows 
the government ‘riding roughshod over 
parliamentary convention’, since it ‘draw[s] 
the executive too closely into Parliament’s 
role of scrutinising how ministers spend 
the money that Parliament votes for the 
running of their portfolios’. Labour had 
allowed comparable practices during its 
term, and the Carter episode is a further 
reminder ‘that the independence of select 
committees is more a mirage than reality’ 
(Armstrong, 2009). And government 
members of Parliament making up the 
majority of the committee’s membership 
is a further reminder of the danger of 
select committees being facsimiles of 
executive instruction as they were in the 
FPP days.
Guardians of the state
Senior public servants have increasingly 
had to deal with their advice competing for 
ministers’ attention with that of political 
advisers during the Clark–Key years.2 The 
public service, as Colin James has argued, 
has the ‘opportunity – I would say the duty 
– to develop and keep in mind a longer 
perspective on what constitutes the public 
interest’. However, National ministers, he 
observes, like their Labour predecessors 
have taken on an influential phalanx of 
personal policy advisers, endowing them 
with
quasi-public service status despite 
being clearly political [they are often 
paid for by departments though 
answerable to the minister and not 
the chief executive] … Ministers are 
often frustrated by constitutional 
niceties. They want things done. 
Departments and agencies often fall 
short of ministers’ hopes, for ideas 
and in execution. So ministers are 
tempted to, and occasionally do, step 
over the boundary. (James, 2009b)
Therefore, if the public service is not 
guarding the guardians, who, asks James, 
is? He states that although it should be 
the the governor-general this is actually 
a nominal power, since the contemporary 
truth is that ‘in our constitution now the 
Governor-General is the cabinet’s gopher’, 
which is a great concern when there is 
‘a Prime Minister who is accumulating 
constitutional minuses’ (James, 2009a). 
how to check the excesses of the executive?
What is the solution to all these 
conspicuous exercises of executive power? 
Can they be remedied? Should they be 
whether new Zealand 
is a republic or realm, 
the necessity of checks 
and balances on the 
executive is critical. 
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changed? Do we care? Yes, we should 
care, but the solutions, remedies and 
changes are not as easy to determine. 
There is no constitutional crisis in New 
Zealand, but we cannot be mollified by 
that tired cliché ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix 
it’. Crises are not in the habit of providing 
a detailed forward agenda. Small events 
can quickly spiral into the chasm of 
constitutional unrest. We need only look 
to comparable constitutional monarchies 
for constitutional crises such as what 
occurred in the United Kingdom during 
the early part of the 20th century, when 
the monarch was actively drawn into a 
parliamentary fracas; in Australia in 1975, 
which witnessed ‘The Dismissal’ by Sir 
John Kerr of Gough Whitlam; and more 
recently in Canada in December 2008, 
when the governor-general controversially 
prorogued Parliament, thus anticipating 
a vote of confidence that could have 
brought down the government. In our 
own backyard Pacific pool, Fiji (as both a 
constitutional monarchy and a republic) 
and Solomon Islands have demonstrated 
the potential constitutional calamities 
that can arise in rapid sequence.
Republic? 
Will becoming a republic allow New 
Zealand the comfort of being immune 
from constitutional emergency? No. If 
the country were to change from the 
Realm to the Republic of New Zealand 
it is almost certain that it would remain 
a parliamentary-based democracy, which 
means most of the same issues would apply. 
Comparable systems that have similar 
characteristics of multi-party politics, 
non-executive heads of state, Cabinet and 
parliamentary-based government which 
we could credibly emulate in becoming a 
republic are India, Ireland and Italy. Their 
vaunted republicanism has not prevented 
executive excess. 
Whether New Zealand is a republic 
or realm, the necessity of checks and 
balances on the executive is critical. 
However, most countries, including 
our own, have the checks and balances; 
the problem is how aware we and 
our representatives are of them. A 
greater awareness and appreciation of 
the responsibilities and duties of our 
governor-general, prime minister, Cabinet 
and individual branches of state, and of 
our own as conscientious citizens would 
do much to limit the excesses of executive 
power. Too often there have been major 
constitutional changes and executive 
actions without comprehensive review 
or participation. The principal political 
actors have, knowingly or not, abdicated 
their responsibility. If not abdicated, then 
they have willingly colluded to abuse 
constitutional safeguards by their actions 
or inactions that have resulted in change 
to our system with worrying ease.
Get rid of MMP?
The prime minister as part of a campaign 
pledge promised a referendum on the 
electoral system. This is more than what 
Sid Holland did with the change to 
unicameralism, or Fraser with the end of 
the country quota.
However, there is still a fear that despite 
a referendum being held in conjunction 
with a general election there would be, 
in Philip Temple’s understanding (NZ 
Herald), ‘no consultation with the voters, 
no review of inquiry, no select committee 
hearings’. Temple and others such as Green 
Party co-leader Metiria Turei believe ‘an 
independent review of how MMP was 
working with full public consultation 
would be better in the first instance than 
spending millions on a referendum’. 
Indeed, rather than weighing in against 
or for MMP, many feel jilted by having 
the issue decided by Cabinet decree with 
its ‘simplistic yes–no referendum’ which 
does not give opportunity to examine 
the merits and demerits of the electoral 
system and any alternatives (NZ Herald, 
2009b). Justice minister Simon Power 
confirmed that a referendum will be held 
in 2011 on MMP and that voters will be 
asked two questions: ‘the first will ask 
voters if they wish to change the voting 
system from MMP. The second will ask 
what alternative voting system they would 
prefer from a list of options’. However, 
even the Cabinet papers released with 
this October 2009 announcement voice 
concern about the potential that ‘voters 
will not know the alternative voting 
systems they will have to choose from’ and 
therefore could ‘have difficulty in making 
an informed choice’ (Power, 2009).
A new separation of powers
Such feelings illustrate the need and the 
importance of knowing and being involved 
with our constitution before undertaking 
system change. Whatever your view on 
the change itself, it should be elementary 
that comprehensive contemplation and 
participation be demonstrated before any 
action is taken. A greater emphasis on 
and understanding of the separation of 
powers is required, and that relies on the 
executive admitting and supporting the 
fact that it is just one of the branches of 
state. A ‘new separation of powers’ could 
see a ‘constrained’ prime minister and 
Cabinet by granting independence and 
influence to ‘other checking institutions’ 
and give a renewed impetus to providing 
constant attention to checks and balances 
(Akerman, 2000).
How can a new separation of 
powers be realised in New Zealand? Our 
constitutional infrastructure is somewhat 
bare so it would require an enhancement 
– though sometimes nothing more than 
a realisation – of the powers of existing 
the British prime 
minister, like ours, 
exercises ‘authority 
in the name of the 
monarch without the 
people and their elected 
representatives in 
their Parliament being 
consulted’, and when 
using these prerogative 
powers ‘it is difficult 
for Parliament to 
scrutinise and challenge 
government’s actions’.
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institutions whose duty it is to check the 
executive and hold it accountable. 
An upper house?
Parliament is the natural fulcrum and 
forum of our system. I have argued 
elsewhere on the value an upper house 
could have added to the New Zealand 
system (Kumarasingham, 2010). Even 
an appointed upper house could use its 
position, despite a weak veto power, to 
highlight legislative or political questions 
about government policy.
A legislative council could have 
copied Britain’s approach and created an 
independent and effective appointments 
commission to make recommendations 
on ‘non-party-political members’. The 
commission could have the power to ‘vet 
all recommendations to the House of 
Lords’, including political appointments, 
which would enhance the convention of 
political parity in the upper house (House 
of Lords Appointments Commission, 
2008). Recent scholarship in the United 
Kingdom argues for the importance 
of an appointed chamber as a critical 
source of ‘deliberative democracy’. 
Rather than focusing on elections and 
voting procedures to define democracy, 
‘deliberative democrats concentrate on 
the processes by which opinion is formed 
and alternatives debated’: as such, the less 
politicised House of Lords has the power 
with its ‘scrutiny and accountability role’ 
to force government ‘to defend in public its 
actions and intentions’ by being effective 
in ‘drawing media or activist attention to 
an issue’. Therefore, the House of Lords 
can ‘catalyse public debate and influence 
the nature of that broader democratic 
discussion’ (Parkinson, 2007). At the very 
least an upper house in New Zealand 
would have added another level for 
legislation to go through, and would have 
potentially halted the fast-tracking of bills 
and other constitutionally questionable 
methods of enacting controversial policy 
(Cooke, 1999, pp.140-1).
More power to Parliament?
In response to the rumblings over his 
predecessor’s creative constitutionalism 
and executive power, Gordon Brown and 
his lord chancellor, Jack Straw, published 
a green paper in July 2007. The paper 
outlined recommendations that would 
restrict executive power to the benefit of 
Parliament. The British prime minister, 
like ours, exercises ‘authority in the name 
of the Monarch without the people and 
their elected representatives in their 
Parliament being consulted’, and when 
using these prerogative powers ‘it is 
difficult for Parliament to scrutinise and 
challenge government’s actions’. Based on 
the recommendations in the green paper, 
here are some proposals for reform that 
could restrict executive power in our own 
Westminster.
• The royal prerogative powers exercised 
by the prime minister are put onto a 
statutory basis and brought under 
stronger parliamentary scrutiny 
and control (though this does not 
propose changes to the governor-
general’s ‘constitutional or personal 
prerogatives, although in some areas 
the Government proposes to change 
the mechanism by which Ministers 
arrive at their recommendations 
on the Monarch’s exercise of those 
powers’).
• A convention is developed under 
which the government could deploy 
armed forces without the approval of 
the House of Representatives.
• A prime minister requires the approval 
of the House of Representatives before 
asking the governor-general for a 
dissolution.
• A majority of members of Parliament 
can ask the speaker to recall the 
House, ‘including in cases where the 
Government itself has not sought a 
recall’.
• The attorney-general is no longer a 
senior member of the government 
and attends Cabinet only when legal 
issues are directly concerned. This 
could enhance public confidence and 
trust in the office of attorney-general 
as the chief legal adviser to the Crown 
and his/her role as guardian of the 
public interest.
• Greater transparency, more 
consultation and a greater role 
for Parliament in major public 
appointments that are carried out 
by executive instruction. In addition, 
for certain appointments, where 
appropriate, the government nominee 
is subject to a pre-appointment 
hearing with the relevant select 
committee.3
Another recommendation is that the 
granting of honours has strictly limited 
political involvement. Indeed, an editorial 
by the New Zealand Herald which backed 
the Key government’s decision to bring 
back titular honours in March 2009 
nonetheless advocated that:
The whole system should be taken 
out of politicians’ hands. The 
honours are awarded in the Queen’s 
name and there seems no reason that 
her representative, the Governor-
General, could not appoint a panel 
to sift nominations and recommend 
a list of worthy recipients. So long 
as it was one function for which the 
office did not have to act on ministers’ 
advice, the system would be relieved 
of suspicion that it might be used for 
political rewards. (NZ Herald, 2009a)
Greater role for the governor-general?
This conveniently suggests another 
proposal: strengthen the role of the 
governor-general as our de facto head 
of state to act more confidently as the 
‘guardian of the Constitution’. This would 
give the office that sits atop the entire 
system a greater check on the system. 
Brown’s green paper for Britain did not 
make direct proposals for changing the 
Queen’s personal and constitutional 
prerogatives (reserve powers), instead 
the council of state 
could act like a Privy 
council, but without 
political executive 
domination, advising the 
governor-general in the 
discharge of the office’s 
powers.
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concentrating on those the government 
exercised in her name. However, it is 
useful to reform (not remove) those 
ancient prerogatives to strengthen a 
governor-general’s authority over them. 
Sir Michael Hardie Boys has outlined the 
five powers, ‘which need not be exercised 
in accordance with advice’, as being:
• to appoint a prime minister;
• to dismiss a prime minister;
• to refuse to dissolve Parliament;
• to force a dissolution of Parliament; 
and
• to refuse assent to legislation. (Hardie 
Boys, 1997)
These five powers are all, or at least 
can be if the situation is not clear, 
controversial and critical. However, a 
governor-general in such situations where 
the decision is far from obvious or where 
he or she is unsure as to the validity 
of the choice is compelled to make 
decisions with minimal opportunity for 
consultation. The governor-general in 
the exercise of the reserve powers, and in 
making other judgements concerning such 
responsibilities as Crown appointments 
and honours, could rely on a ‘Council of 
State’ to assist and add credence to the 
his or her choices. This Council of State 
with a membership similar to the Irish 
Council of State4 could act as an ‘integrity 
branch’ (Akerman, 2000, pp.294-6) made 
up of the highest practitioners from the 
three branches of state and chaired by the 
governor-general (see Power, 2008). The 
Council of State could act like a Privy 
Council, but without political executive 
domination, advising the governor-
general in the discharge of the office’s 
powers. The Council of State would thus 
strengthen the governor-general by not 
only providing expert advice, but also 
by removing through its existence and 
mana a sense of submissiveness towards 
the political executive. It would end the 
isolation a modern governor-general feels 
when making major decisions to become 
a real guardian of the constitution.
No magic formula or constitutional 
fantasy will make New Zealand into 
some democratic utopia. There can be no 
hope of some divine oracle announcing 
granite laws of constitutional perfection 
to a Moses or Maui on Mount Sinai or 
Mount Ruapehu. We should, however, be 
ever mindful of the dangerous potential 
for executive excesses that have been 
demonstrated since before the time of 
Fraser and Holland, and certainly since, 
due to ignorant or lazy observance and 
understanding of the New Zealand 
constitution. We would do well to be 
vigilant and prevent further misuse.
1  [2003] 3 New Zealand Law Reports 643
2  For a more thoroughgoing analysis of these issues see 
Boston and Halligan (2009).
3  These recommendations are taken directly from Secretary of 
State for Justice (2007). 
4  The Irish Council of State is composed of the prime minister, 
deputy prime minister, chief justice, president of the High 
Court, presiding officers of the two houses of Parliament, 
attorney-general, any former president, prime minister or 
chief justice willing to serve and up to seven presidential 
nominees.
